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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
TANGREN FAMILY TRUST, by 
RICHARD TANGREN, Trustee and 
RICHARD TANGREN, Individually, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
RODNEY TANGREN 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT ON GRANT OF CERTIORARI 
JURISDICTION 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2-2(3)(a) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal 
from the Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals, dated December 29,2006 (the "Opinion") 
and designated as Tangren Family Trust, by Richard Tangren. Trustee and Richard Tangren, 
Individually v. Rodney Tangren. 154 P.3d 180, 2006 UT App. 515. A copy of the Opinion 
is attached hereto as Addendum "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Did the Utah Court of Appeals erroneously apply the parol evidence rule? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "In proceedings on petition for writ of certiorari, 
Court of Appeals No. 20050085-CA 
Supreme Court No. 20070097-SC 
Supreme Court affords no deference to conclusions of law reached by the court of appeals 
or the district court. In proceedings on petition for writ of certiorari, Supreme Court reviews 
the decision of the court of appeals for correctness." Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.. 
2007 UT 28, f 11, - P.3d -. "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals, 
not the trial court." Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Com'n. 2006 UT 58,147 
P.3dll89. 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
I. U. S. CONST., AMEND. V, which reads as follows: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
II. U.S. CONST., AMEND. XIV § 1, which reads as follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
III. UT. CONST., ART. I § 7, which reads that, "[n]o person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty or property, without due process of law." 
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IV. UT. CONST., ART. I § 24, which states that "[a]ll laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform operation." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 29, 2002, Petitioner filed his Complaint against his son, Rodney Tangren 
(herein after "Respondent") alleging that Respondent had violated terms of the lease 
agreement dated February 24, 1994 (hereinafter, the "Lease"). R002-R019. On June 13, 
2002, Respondent filed his Answer and Counterclaim to the Appellee's Complaint, alleging 
that he had lawful possession of the property at issue as a lessee. R022-R028. Respondent 
claimed that he had lawful possession of the property as a lessee and that Petitioner had 
trespassed to real property. R025 at 1ff[5-l0. 
On July 11,2002, Petitioner filed an Answer to the Appellant's Counterclaim. R029-
R030. On July 22,2002, upon completion of the parties' planning conference, the Rule 26(f) 
Planning Conference Report and Stipulation was filed with the Seventh Judicial District 
Court. It outlined discovery dates, how discovery should be conducted, and other important 
factors under Rule 26(f). R031-R033. On July 29, 2002, Petitioner filed his initial 
disclosures. R039-R041. On September 11, 2002, Respondent filed his initial disclosures. 
R042-R043. The parties then proceeded to file interrogatories and answers in this matter. 
R044-R047. 
On November 8,2004, the Petitioner filed the Amended Complaint, clarifying that the 
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Lease drafted in 1994 did not form a valid contract between the parties. The Amended 
Complaint specifically indicated that the Lease was drafted to be used only where 
Respondent's siblings took action against Respondent or the subject properties in an effort 
to gain an interest therein. Furthermore, the Amended Complaint indicated that the property 
was then valued at two million ($2,000,000.00) dollars. The Amended Complaint indicated 
that, considering the value of the property, the rent payment set forth in the Lease of $150 
per month was unconscionable, and therefore void. The Amended Complaint additionally 
alleged that the parties had not ever treated the Lease as a valid lease agreement. R075 at 
1f32(a>(d). 
On November 15, 2004, Petitioner filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim in 
which he added two affirmative defenses to his counterclaim. R092-R101. The Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim added the fourth cause of action, which was Fraud, and a fifth 
cause of action, which was Negligent Misrepresentation. R098-R099. 
On August 25,2004, and November 17 and 18,2004, the allegations contained in the 
Amended Complaint and the Amended Answer and Counterclaim came for trial before 
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson of the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for San Juan 
County, State of Utah. R127-R134. At the conclusion of the trial in this matter, the trial 
court found the Lease to be invalid and, thus, no award was granted to either the Petitioner 
or Respondent at that time. Id. The parties were instructed to pay their own attorneys fees 
and costs in this matter. Id. On January 12,2005, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact 
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and Order (the "Order"). R127-R134. A copy of the Order is attached hereto as Addendum 
"B" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
On January 19,2005, Respondent filed his Notice of Appeal from the Order. R138-
R139. On March 17,2006, Respondent filed his opening brief challenging (1) whether the 
trial court erred "with regard to its statement of legal principles governing the construction 
interpretation of lease agreements and associated issues raised by the Counterclaim in this 
case;" (2) whether the trial court erred in concluding that the Lease Agreement was invalid, 
based upon parol evidence testimony as to the intent of the parties that contradicted the 
explicit terms of the written Lease Agreement;" and (3) whether the trial court failed "to 
make adequate findings of fact upon which the Order of the trial court could be based." See, 
Appellant's Brief'at pp. 1-2. 
On December 29, 2006, the Utah Court of Appeals entered the Opinion. See, 
Addendum "A." The Utah Court of Appeals concluded that the parties had entered into a 
valid, integrated and unambiguous lease agreement, determining that the trial court's implicit 
finding that the contract was not integrated was clearly erroneous based upon application of 
the parol evidence rule. Id. The Utah Court of Appeals, in essence determined that the lack 
of ambiguity in the remaining portions of the Lease weighed heavily in favor of finding that 
the agreement of which it was a part is integrated. Id. Since the trial court had not addressed 
the issue of whether a breach of the Lease had occurred, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed 
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the decision based on the foregoing conclusions and remanded the case for further 
proceedings respecting the issue of whether Respondent had breached the Lease. Id 
On January 29, 2007, Petitioner filed its Petition for Writ of Certiorari asking this 
Court to grant certiorari on three (3) possible issues, to wit: (1) Did the Utah Court of 
Appeals erroneously fail to require Appellant/Respondent to adhere to the marshaling 
requirement, rendering a decision based upon the facts as presented by the 
Appellant/Respondent rather than the facts as they were presented to the trial court in their 
entirety? (2) Did the Utah Court of Appeals erroneously strictly apply the parol evidence rule 
to a challenge to the integration of a contract in light of its recent determination that Utah no 
longer strictly applies the parol evidence rule as determinative, but has determined that it is 
simply part of the initial inquiry to determine whether an ambiguity exists in the contract's 
language? (3) Did the Utah Court of Appeals violate Appellee/Petitioner's due process rights 
under U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V and XIV § 1 and UTAH CONST. ART. I §7 by depriving 
Appellee/Petitioner his interest in the property at issue herein in spite of a mutually explicit 
understanding between the parties that the Lease .would not be recorded unless 
Appellant/Respondent's siblings attempted to infringe upon Appellant/Respondent's interest 
in the property? 
On April 27,2007, this Court issued its Order granting certiorari and briefing on the 
issue of "whether the court of appeals erred in its assessment of the parol evidence rule." See, 
Order dated April 27,2007. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early 1950s, with the encouragement and help from his brother, Petitioner 
purchased some land known as the Anderson Bottom, together with some cattle, from Ralph 
Miller. Petitioner purchased the cattle and his brother purchased the land, and together they 
ran a cattle business for many years. Tr. Vol. I1 at p. 15. Some years later, the federal 
government and the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") decided to make a national park 
and Petitioner and his brother were forced from Anderson Bottom. Petitioner still had two 
hundred and fifty (250) head of cattle, however, so it was imperative that he locate and 
purchase other property. Petitioner relocated to land on the Colorado River (the "Colorado 
River Land"), which he purchased from State Institutional Trust Lands ("SITLA") and the 
BLM for the purpose of continuing his cattle business. The Colorado River Land is the land 
now in dispute in the instant case. Tr. Vol. I, at p. 16. 
Petitioner made numerous improvements to the Colorado River Land and spent a large 
amount of money and time for said improvements. Respondent was employed by Petitioner 
at their fencing company from 1972 to 1989. Petitioner assisted in the improvements on the 
Colorado River Land; to wit: Respondent built two (2) building structures, one as an area 
for hot tubs and the second encased a two thousand (2000) gallon propane tank. Petitioner 
1
 To avoid confusion, Petitioner refers throughout to the Transcripts in this matter as 
"Vol. I" for the First Day and First Day - Continued; "Vol. II" as the Second Day of Trial and 
Second Day - Continued; and "Vol. Ill" as the Third Day of Trial. 
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did not pay for these two structures built by the Respondent. Respondent was paid salary due 
to his employment at their fencing company. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 194 and 196. 
Petitioner testified that Respondent had done more work and shown more interest in 
the ranch than his other children. Tr. Vol. II at pp. 112-113. In 1994, Respondent quit his 
own fencing company to come work for Petitioner full time on the ranch. Respondent 
became worried that the dude ranch would produce a large income and that his siblings 
would then want an interest in it and would try and take it from him. Respondent spoke with 
Petitioner about his concern and Petitioner told Respondent that he would take action to 
ensure Petitioner's siblings could not take his interest in the dude ranch from him. Petitioner 
then spoke to his attorneys in Las Vegas, Nevada, who instructed him that he had to sign a 
lease to protect Respondent's interests. Petitioner was reluctant to do so, however, the 
attorneys informed him that the Lease was the only way to legally protect Respondent's 
interests. Petitioner instructed the attorneys to draft the Lease. Petitioner testified at the trial 
in this matter that his understanding of the drafting of such a lease was for the purpose of 
keeping the other children from being able to come in and take the ranch from the 
Respondent. Tr. Vol. I at p. 51-55. Furthermore, he reiterated to Respondent what the 
purpose of the Lease was, that it was a stop gap measure and not a lease that will prevent his 
sibling from taking the ranch from him in the future. Tr. Vol. I at p. 104. Moreover, 
Petitioner understood that it was only to be used in the event of his passing away. Tr. Vol. 
I at pp. 105-106. 
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Respondent also testified that the purpose of the Lease was to protect him from his 
brothers and sisters and would come into effect only if something happened to Petitioner. 
Tr. Vol. II at pp. 19-20. Respondent additionally testified that, as long as Petitioner was 
living, Respondent did not anticipate his siblings attempting to take the ranch. Id. 
The Lease was drafted and signed by both parties on or about February 24,1994. Tr. 
Vol II at p 20. The parties stipulated to the Lease being signed in 1994. Petitioner testified 
that he never gave a copy of the Lease to the Respondent and that he kept it with his 
documents that he moved to a house that Respondent was living in when the fencing 
company was sold. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 55, 57-58. Petitioner testified that he did not see the 
Lease again until the year 2001. On July 19, 2001, after a falling out with Petitioner, 
Respondent found and recorded the Lease with the San Juan County Recorder. R009. 
Respondent failed to provide Petitioner with a copy of the recorded Lease. Tr. Vol. I at p. 
68. 
In March of 2002, Petitioner's counsel reviewed the documents and sent a notice to 
Respondent at the address provided in the Lease, which was returned to counsel after three 
(3) separate delivery attempts of March 23, March 28, and April 9, 2002. Tr. Vol. II at p. 
165. On April 29, 2002, Petitioner filed the action in this matter. R002-R019. On August 
25, 2004, and November 17 and 18, 2004, the allegations contained in the Amended 
Complaint and the Amended Answer and Counterclaim came for trial before Honorable Lyle 
R. Anderson of the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for San Juan County, State of Utah. 
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R127-R134. At the conclusion of the trial in this matter, the trial court found the Lease to 
be invalid and, thus, no award was granted to either Respondent or Petitioner. Id. The trial 
court found that it had received sufficient information to show that the Lease was never 
intended to be a valid document unless Respondent was at risk of losing his interests in the 
ranch to his siblings upon Petitioner's death. Id, see Tr. Vol. Ill at p. 3. On January 12, 
2005, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Order, from which Respondent timely 
appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. A copy of the Findings of Fact and Order is attached 
hereto as Addendum "B" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Respondent challenged that the Lease was 
a valid and binding lease, entitling him to enforcement. Respondent's first challenge was 
based upon his contention that the Lease contained the essential elements of a contract, was 
folly integrated and unambiguous, and was invalidated by the trial court contrary to Utah law. 
Respondent also raised a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial 
court's invalidation of the Lease and the improper denial of his counterclaim. Respondent 
relied almost exclusively on the parol evidence rule in arguing the integration and ambiguity 
of the Lease. See, Appellant's Brief dX pp. 26-36. 
In Petitioner's Reply Brief of Appellee, Petitioner argued that Respondent had failed 
to adequately marshal the evidence in his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and 
that the trial court had correctly determined that the Lease was not a valid and binding 
contract. See, Reply Brief of Appellee dXpp. 14-24. Petitioner relied upon the recent case of 
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Gillmorv.Macev. 2005 UT App 351,121 P.3d 57 and its acknowledgment of this Court's 
decision in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995), both indicating 
that Utah no longer strictly applied the parol evidence rule as determinative, but that it was 
simply part of the initial inquiry to determine whether an ambiguity existed. Id. Petitioner 
additionally pointed out that Respondent had failed to marshal all of the evidence in favor 
of the trial court's findings, and set forth specific pertinent facts omitted by the Respondent, 
such as his concession as to the purpose for entering into the Lease, or the integration 
specifically at issue on appeal. 
After briefing and arguments on the appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals entered the 
Opinion on December 29,2006. See, Addendum "A." The Utah Court of Appeals undertook 
an analysis of the matter under the parol evidence rule, in reliance upon Union Bank v. 
Swenson. 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985) and Hall v. Process Instruments & Control Inc., 890 
P.2d 1024 (Utah 1995). It found that any relevant evidence, including parol evidence, is 
admissible in the preliminary determination of integration; however, courts must "apply a 
rebuttable presumption that a writing which on its face appears to be an integrated agreement 
is what it appears to be." Addendum "A" at | 8 , citing Union Bank at 665. The Court of 
Appeals determined that Petitioner had not overcome the presumption of integration, finding 
that the Petitioner's testimony was the sole evidence on which the trial court could have 
based its ruling that the Lease was invalid. Id. at [^9. It specifically said, "[w]hile the trial 
court could consider [Petitioner's] testimony regarding his intent in creating the Lease, the 
court erred in relying on that testimony in the face of a clear and unambiguous integration 
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clause in the Lease itself." Id, see, Cantamar. 2006 UT App 321 at f 11. The Court of 
Appeals concluded that the trial court's findings as to integration were clearly erroneous and 
that the Lease was an integrated agreement "against which parol evidence may not be 
admitted absent some ambiguity in the terms of the Lease." Id.; see HalL 890 P.2d at 1027. 
The Court of Appeals then undertook an analysis of the ambiguity of the terms of the 
Lease, although it recognized that".. .neither party argu[ed] that the language of the Lease 
create[d] any ambiguity. . ." Addendum "A" at [^10. It recognized that the proffered 
extrinsic evidence addressed only the Petitioner's subjective reasoning for entering into the 
Lease, which did not uncover any ambiguity in the Lease itself. Id. at f 1L It determined 
that, since there was no ambiguity in the remaining portions of the Lease, the trial court 
improperly allowed Petitioner's testimony to modify the terms of the Lease, presumably 
meaning the integration of the Lease. Id 
The Court of Appeals then acknowledged the evidence presented as to the breach of 
the contract, namely that Respondent had not made monthly payments to Petitioner for a 
period of several years but had tendered larger payments by check later. It determined that 
those payments by check were not addressed in the trial court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. The Court of Appeals thus remanded the matter for further proceedings 
on the alleged breach of contract after reversing the trial court's decision as to the integration 
of the Lease. 
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On January 29, 2007, Appellee filed its Petition for Writ of Certiorari asking this 
Court to grant certiorari on three (3) possible issues: (1) Did the Utah Court of Appeals 
erroneously fail to require Appellant/Respondent to adhere to the marshaling requirement, 
rendering a decision based upon the facts as presented by the Appellant/Respondent rather 
than the facts as they were presented to the trial court in their entirety? (2) Did the Utah Court 
of Appeals erroneously strictly apply the parol evidence rule to a challenge to the integration 
of a contract in light of its recent determination that Utah no longer strictly applies the parol 
evidence rule as determinative, but has determined that it is simply part of the initial inquiry 
to determine whether an ambiguity exists in the contract's language? (3) Did the Utah Court 
of Appeals violate Appellee/Petitioner's due process rights under U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V 
and XIV § 1 and UTAH CONST. ART. I §7 by depriving Appellee/Petitioner his interest in the 
property at issue herein in spite of a mutually explicit understanding between the parties that 
the Lease would not be recorded unless Appellant/Respondent's siblings attempted to 
infringe upon Appellant/Respondent's interest in the property? 
On April 27,2007, this Court issued an Order granting certiorari and briefing on the 
issue of "whether the court of appeals erred in its assessment of the parol evidence rule." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court has long held that, "[e]vidence . . .attacking the existence of a written 
contract,... is admissible as an exception to the general rule prohibiting consideration of 
extrinsic evidence to alter or vary the terms of a written contract." Moody v. Smith, 9 Utah 
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2d 139,141-142, 340 P.2d 83, 84-85 (Utah 1959). In Nielsen v. MFT Leasing, this Court 
reiterated that evidence that attacks the very existence of the contract for the purpose of 
proving it unenforceable does not contravene the parol evidence rule. Ibid., 656 P.2d 454, 
455 (Utah 1982)(citations omitted). Additionally, this Court has determined that "[p]arol 
evidence is admissible to show that written instruments were delivered to be effective only 
on happening of contingency." Parker v. Weber Co. Irr. Dist. 251 P. 11 (Utah 1926). Our 
United States 10th Circuit Court of Appeals supports this concept by stating as follows: 
A collateral parol agreement that a contract shall become effective only on 
certain conditions or contingencies is not an oral contradiction or variation of 
written instrument but goes to very existence of contract and tends to show that 
no binding or effective contract ever existed, and therefore parol evidence is 
admissible to show such condition precedent relating to taking effect o f written 
instrument. 
Henderson v. Pierson. 201 F.2d 740, 741 (CA.10.Okla. 1953). In Cimarron Ins. Co. v. 
Pomeroy. the 10th Circuit also held that, "[p]arol evidence which does not impugn the 
integrity of the writings to which it relates is admissible to show a condition precedent to the 
taking effect of the engagements therein." Ibid, 234 F.2d 262, 263 (C.A.10 Okla. 1956). 
".. .[0]ral testimony showing the terms and conditions under which a written contract shall 
become effective is not integrated in the written contract if the writings of the parties are 
silent with respect thereto and the oral proof is not inconsistent with such writings." 
Dawault v. Baruch Oil Corp., 231 F.2d 413, 414 (C.A.10 Wy. 1956); see Annotation 70 
A.L.R. 752; 20 AmJur. Evidence, §§ 1135,1136,1137,1138-1140. The United States 9th 
Circuit Court of Appeals may have articulated it best when it held that the parol evidence rule 
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""presupposes an action based on a valid contract; and if the issue is as to the existence or 
validity of the alleged contract, the rule, by its very terms, has no application." Baskin 
Distribution, Inc. v. Pittwav Corp.. 141 F.3d 1173 (Table) (C.A.9 (Wash.), 1998). 
The Court of Appeals inappropriately strictly applied the parol evidence rule to its 
determination in the instant matter. The trial court bifurcated the integration clause from the 
remainder of the contract in its determination as to the "ambiguity"of the Lease, but then 
concluding that the lack of ambiguity in the remaining terms of the Lease not argued or 
challenged by either party rendered the integration clause unambiguous and not subject to 
parol evidence. The trial court correctly concluded, based on both parties testimonies, that 
the Lease was not intended as a binding contract between Petitioner and Respondent, but 
only for the purpose of protecting Respondent should something happen to Petitioner and 
Respondent's siblings tried to take an interest in the property. As argued more particularly 
below, the Utah Court of Appeals' Opinion should thus be overturned and the trial court's 
Order affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY STRICTLY 
APPLIED THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AS DETERMINATIVE. 
Under 3 Corbin on Contracts, § 573, the parole evidence rule is analyzed and defined 
as follows: 
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to 
which they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that 
contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings 
and negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or 
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contradicting the writing. This is in substance what is called the 'parol 
evidence rule/ a rule that scarcely deserves to be called a rule of evidence of 
any kind, and a rule that is as truly applicable to written evidence as to parol 
evidence. The use of such a name for this rule has had unfortunate 
consequences, principally by distracting the attention from the real issues that 
are involved. These issues may be any one or more of the following: (1) Have 
the parties made a contract? (2) Is that contract void or voidable because of 
illegality, fraud, mistake, or any other reason? (3) Did the parties assent to a 
particular writing as the complete and accurate 'integration' of that contract?' 
(pp. 357-359.) 
The United States 9th Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the parol evidence rule, stating 
that it "presupposes an action based on a valid contract; and if the issue is as to the existence 
or validity of the alleged contract, the rule, by its very terms, has no application." Baskin 
Distribution, Inc. v. Pittwav Corp.. 141 F.3d 1173 (Table) (C.A.9 (Wash.), 1998). 
This Court takes a similar view of that of the 9th Circuit and has long held that, 
"[e]vidence.. .attacking the existence of a written contract,... is admissible as an exception 
to the general rule prohibiting consideration of extrinsic evidence to alter or vary the terms 
of a written contract." Moodv v. Smith. 9 Utah 2d 139,141-142,340 P.2d 83, 84-85 (Utah 
1959). In O'Harav.Hall. this Court stated that, "[i]t is the rule 'that where the existence of 
a contract is the point in issue and the evidence is conflicting or admits of more than one 
inference, it is for the jury to determine whether the contract did in fact exist.9" Ibid, 628 
P.2d 1289,1291 (Utah 1981), c/YmgPre-Fit Doors v. Dor-Wavs. 13 ArizApp. 438,477 P.2d 
557 (1970); see also Field v. Golden Triangle Broadcasting. 451 Pa. 410, 305 A.2d 689 
(1973); Havs v. Underwood. 196 Kan. 265, 411 P.2d 717 (1966); Ferreira v. Honolulu 
Star-Bulletin. 44 Hawaii 567,356 P.2d 651 (1960); Megarrv Brothers v. United States 404 
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F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1968). "Whether the parties intended to enter a binding contract is such 
an issue of fact. . . . [t]here is no meeting of the minds where the parties do not intend to 
contract and the question of intent generally is one to be determined by the trier of fact." Id. 
Similarly in Nielsen v. MFT Leasing, this Court reiterated that evidence that attacks 
the very existence of the contract for the purpose of proving it unenforceable does not 
contravene the parol evidence rule. Ibid., 656 P.2d 454,455 (Utah 1982), citing Nielsen v. 
Richter. 20 Cal.App.2d 546,67 P.2d 353 (1937); Berta v. Rocchio. 149 Colo. 325,369 P.2d 
51 (1962); Lennen & Newell Inc. v. Clark Enterprises, Inc.. 51 Hawaii 233, 456 P.2d 231 
(1969); Casentini v. Nevada National Bank. 88 Nev. 456,499 P.2d 652 (1972). Other state 
and federal jurisdictions have also held that parol evidence is always competent to show the 
existence of a contract. See, Dabbs v. Int'l Minerals & Chemical Corp., 339 F. Supp. 654, 
6654 n.22 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Tepsich v. Howe Constr. Co.. 138 N.W.2d 376, 378 (Mich. 
1965); Smith v.Worsham. 552 S.W.2d 367, 371 (Mo. App. 1977); Halldin v. Usher. 321 
P.2d 746,748 (Cal. 1958); see also, Agristor Leasing v. Bertholf. 753 F. Supp. 881, 894-95 
(D. Kan. 1990) ("parol evidence has been held admissible to show the nonexistence of a 
binding contract"); Baskin Distrib. v. Pittwav Corp.. 141 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 1998) ("the 
parol evidence rule does not apply when the parties are seeking to establish the validity or 
invalidity of a contract"); Segaline v. Bank of Am.. N.A.. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8349, 
2003 WL 21135553, fn. 1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2003)("the parol evidence rule does not 
prevent the consideration of such evidence when the existence of the contract is at issue"); 
-17-
Muhm v.Davis. 580 S.W.2d 98, 101 (Tex.App. - Houston [1st District])("Parol evidence is 
always competent to show the nonexistence of a contract or the conditions upon which it may 
become effective."). 
As it pertains to Muhm's concept of "the conditions upon which it may become 
effective," this Court has also addressed such a matter, stating that, "[p]arol evidence is 
admissible to show that written instruments were delivered to be effective only on happening 
of contingency." Parker v. Weber Co. Irr. Dist. 251 P. 11 (Utah 1926). Our United States 
10th Circuit Court of Appeals supports this concept by stating as follows: 
A collateral parol agreement that a contract shall become effective only on 
certain conditions or contingencies is not an oral contradiction or variation of 
written instrument but goes to very existence of contract and tends to show that 
no binding or effective contract ever existed, and therefore parol evidence is 
admissible to show such condition precedent relating to taking effect of written 
instrument. 
Henderson v. Pierson. 201 F.2d740,741 (CA.10.Okla. 1953). The Court acknowledged in 
Henderson that the trial court therein had found that the parties had agreed that ". . .the 
written purchase order for equipment was not to be final and effective until Pierson and 
Cease had received bids from the other suppliers, and then only if Pierson and Cease sent a 
check for $5,405.00 to cover the down payment to Henderson." Id. These criteria having 
not occurred, and this finding having been supported by substantial evidence and not clearly 
erroneous, was thus binding on the 10th Circuit in their determination. Id. The 10th Circuit 
concluded that the contract in Henderson never became effective since the preconditions had 
not been met. Id. 
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Subsequent to Henderson, the 10th Circuit further addressed the issue as it pertained 
to the integrity of the instrument. In Cimarron Ins. Co. v. Pomeroy, the 10th Circuit held that, 
"[p]arol evidence which does not impugn the integrity of the writings to which it relates is 
admissible to show a condition precedent to the taking effect of the engagements therein." 
Ibid., 234 F.2d 262, 263 (C.A.IO Okla. 1956). That same year in a separate case, the 10th 
Circuit expanded upon this concept, stating that, "oral testimony showing the terms and 
conditions under which a written contract shall become effective is not integrated in the 
written contract if the writings of the parties are silent with respect thereto and the oral proof 
is not inconsistent with such writings." Dayvault v. Baruch Oil Corp., 231 F.2d 413, 414 
(C.A.10 Wy. 1956); see Annotation 70 A.L.R. 752; 20 Am.Jur. Evidence, §§ 1135, 1136, 
1137,1138-1140. 
In Gillmor v. Macev. 2005 UT App 351, 121 P.3d 57, the Utah Court of Appeals 
undertook an extensive analysis of the parol evidence rule, in reliance on this Court's 
decision in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995), and 
Nielsen v. Gold's Gym. 2003 UT 37 f7, 78 P.3d 600, providing as follows: 
Under Utah law, if the initial review of the plain language of a contract, within 
its four corners, reveals no patently obvious ambiguities, the inquiry into 
whether an ambiguity exists in a contract does not always end there. Utah's 
rules of contract interpretation allow courts to consider any relevant evidence 
to determine whether a latent ambiguity exists in contract terms that otherwise 
appear to be unambiguous. See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass 'n< 907 
P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995) ("When determining whether a contract is 
ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered.") see also Nielsen v. 
Gold's Gvm. 2003 UT 37 f7, 78 P.3d 600 (stating that any "[relevant, 
extrinsic evidence 'of the facts known to the parties at the time they entered the 
[contract]1 is admissible to assist the court in determining whether the contract 
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is ambiguous") (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). [FN14] In 
adopting this approach to the interpretation of contracts and contract 
ambiguities, the Utah Supreme Court has reasoned that "[ojtherwise, the 
determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it is based solely 
on the 'extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and 
experience.1" 
Ward. 907 P.2d at 268.(citations omitted) Therefore, [although the terms of 
an instrument may seem clear to a particular reader-including a judge-this 
does not rule out the possibility that the parties chose the language of the 
agreement to express a different meaning. A judge should therefore consider 
any credible evidence offered to show the parties' intention. Id. See also 
Nielsen, 2003 UT 37 at 17, 78 P.3d 600. Thus, a " '[Rational interpretation 
requires at least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to 
prove the intention of the parties ... so that the court can "place itself in the 
same situation in which the parties found themselves at the time of 
contracting."'" Ward, 907 P.2d at 268 (second alteration in original) (citations 
omitted). 
[FN14] In this regard, Utah case law has rejected the strict 
application of the "four corners" rule, which limits the 
boundaries of inquiry into whether an ambiguity exists in a 
contract to the contract's "four corners"and effectively excludes 
the evidence of any surrounding circumstances—outside of the 
writing—that might indicate that the contract language lacks the 
required degree of clarity. See, e.g. Oakwood Vill. L.L.C. v. 
Albertson's. Inc.. 2004 UT 10 \ 17, 104 P.3d 1226 (typifying 
application of "four corners" rule of contract analysis when 
written instrument is unambiguous and complete). See generally 
2 E. Allen Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts, §§ 7.12-7.12a 
(2d ed.2001) (explaining the four corners rule and the varying 
degrees of stringency with which it is applied by state courts). 
Likewise, Utah no longer strictly applies the "parol evidence 
rule" or the "plain meaning rule," which exclude the use of any 
parol evidence to show whether a contract's language lacks the 
required degree of clarity. See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers 
Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264,268 (Utah 1995) ("While there is Utah case 
law that espouses a stricter application of the [parol evidence] 
rule and would restrict a determination of whether ambiguity 
exists to a judge's determination of the meaning of the terms of 
the writing itself, [see, e.g. Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel 
Inc.. 2002 UT 62 fl6, 52 P.3d 1179 the better-reasoned 
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approach is to consider the writing in light of the surrounding 
circumstances."). See generally 2 Farnsworth § 7.12; 5 Margaret 
N. Kniffin, Corbin on Contracts § 24.7 (rev. ed.1998) 
(discussing the various views courts have on how the parol 
evidence and plain meaning rules should be applied in contract 
interpretation). Instead, Utah law has made these rules of 
interpretation just part of the initial inquiry to determine whether 
an ambiguity exists in contract language. They are no longer the 
determinative rules they once were when parties asserted that a 
contract contained ambiguities. See See Ward v. Intermountain 
Farmers Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995); Nielsen v. 
Gold's Gvm. 2003 UT 37, f7, 78 P.3d 600. 
Ibid. at1f35. 
Petitioner testified at the trial in this matter that his understanding of the drafting of 
the Lease was for the purpose of keeping the other children from being able to come in and 
take the ranch from the Respondent. Tr. Vol. I at p. 51-55. Furthermore, he testified that he 
reiterated to Respondent what the purpose of the Lease was, that it was not a lease, but a stop Up 
gap measure that will prevent his sibling from taking the ranch from him in the future. Tr. 
Vol. I at p. 104. Moreover, Petitioner understood that it was only to be used in the event of 
his passing away. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 105-106. 
Respondent also testified that the purpose of the Lease was to protect him from his 
' yi 
Tr. Vol. II at pp. 19-20. Respondent additionally testified that, as long as Petitioner was I 
living, Respondent did not anticipate his siblings attempting to take the ranch. Id. 
On January 12, 2005, the trial court entered its Order, which sets forth, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
brothers and sisters and would come into effect only if something happened to Petitioner. JAJQ 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
9. The Court finds that the lease was prepared at the behest of Richard 
Tangren, that he had advice of counsel with regard to its terms and 
went against the advice of counsel. The Court finds that his actions 
against the counsel of his attorneys in the execution and content of the 
lease is an indication of his effort to make a concession to Rodney 
Tangren and that the agreement would not come into effect unless there 
was a quarrel or dispute with the Tangren siblings. 
10. The Court finds that based upon the foregoing, the document noted in 
this litigation as the "Lease" was intended as a protection against an 
incursion upon the Defendant by his siblings and was not intended to 
govern actions as between Richard Tangren and Rodney Tangren and 
both parties agreed and understood that it would only take effect if 
challenged by Rodney's siblings. 
11. The Court finds that the "Lease" is not a valid document. 
12. The Court finds that Rodney Tangren knew the "Lease" was not 
intended as a functioning agreement between the Tangren trust and 
Defendant and was intended to protect Rodney from incursions or 
challenges by his siblings. 
13. The Court finds that there was no reliance on the lease document as a 
valid and binding lease by Rodney Tangren. 
14. As the Court has found the lease to be invalid, there was no 
requirement to pay rent and thereby no rent is due from Rodney 
Tangren to Richard Tangren. 
15. The Court finds that Rodney Tangren knew that the agreement was not 
between he and Richard, but was to protect him from his siblings and 
therefore, there was no fraud with induced him or caused any damage 
to Rodney. 
In short, the trial court determined that the Lease was not a valid and binding contract 
between the parties, basing its determination on the evidence conceded to by both parties that 
the Lease was only to be a protection for Rodney against his siblings, in the event of 
Richard's death. Based on its invalidation of the Lease, the trial court refused to grant 
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Richard any monetary relief for rent thereunder requested in his counterclaim. Respondent 
appealed from the Order. 
On March 17, 2006, Respondent filed their opening brief with the Utah Court of 
Appeals challenging (1) whether the trial court erred "with regard to its statement of legal 
principles governing the construction interpretation of lease agreements and associated issues 
raised by the Counterclaim in this case;" (2) whether the trail court erred in concluding that 
the Lease Agreement was invalid, based upon parol evidence testimony as to the intent of the 
parties that contradicted the explicit terms of the written Lease Agreement;" and (3) whether 
the trial court failed "to make adequate findings of fact upon which the Order of the trial 
court could be based." See, Appellant ys Brief at pp. 1 -2. Respondent raised the issue of parol 
evidence with respect to an ambiguity in the Lease in the Appellant ys Brief, arguing that the 
trial court made no findings with respect to the presumption of integration. Id. at pp. 28-29. 
On May 25,2007, Petitioner filed the Reply Brief of Appellee challenging that the trial 
court correctly determined that the Lease was not a binding and valid contract, and that such 
a determination was supported by the evidence presented. Petitioner argued that the parol 
evidence rule was no longer strictly applied in Utah, relying on Gillmor, and that it was 
simply part of the initial inquiry, arguing that any relevant evidence was admissible in 
determining the integration of the Lease. Reply Brief of Appellee at pp. 27-28. 
On December 29, 2006, the Utah Court of Appeals entered the Opinion in favor of 
Respondent. See, Addendum "A." The Utah Court of Appeals concluded that the parties had 
entered into a valid, integrated and unambiguous lease agreement, determining that the trial 
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court's implicit finding that the contract was not integrated was clearly erroneous based upon 
application of the parol evidence rule. Id. The Utah Court of Appeals, in essence determined 
that the lack of ambiguity in the remaining portions of the Lease weighed heavily in favor 
of finding that the agreement of which it was a part is integrated. Id. Since the trial court 
had not addressed the issue of whether a breach of the Lease had occurred, the Utah Court 
of Appeals reversed the decision based on the foregoing conclusions and remanded the case 
for further proceedings respecting the issue of whether Respondent had breached the Lease. 
Id. 
I The Utah Court of Appeals strictly app lied the parol evidence rule, determining that the trial 
court could not rely on extrinsic evidence in the "face of clear and unambiguous integration 
clause in the Lease itself." Addendum "A" at f 9. 
i 
The parol evidence rule, no longer strictly applied, requires a two-step undertaking 
to determine integration and then ambiguity in the remaining terms of the Lease. As to the 
integration of the Lease, however, the trial court is allowed to consider any relevant evidence 
in its determination, charging that a presumption exists that must be overcome that the 
writing is what it appears to be. As recognized by Gillmor. however, ". . .a rational 
interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered 
to prove the intention of the parties...so that the court can 'place itself in the same situation 
in which the parties found themselves at the time of contracting." Ibid, at %35. 
The concepts contained in Gillmor support the standing precedent from this Court and 
the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals which allows for admission of parol evidence with respect 
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to the question of whether a contract exists. £ge,Xloody, MFT Leasing, Parker, Henderson, J[( o /^j 
Cimarron, Dayvault. The evidence presented m this matter by both parties'testimonies was -jf* 0 
that the contract was only intended to be a ^op-gap measure to protect Respondent from his -^ 
siblings in the event of Petitioner's death. The trial court correctly allowed for the admission 
of evidence pertaining to the collateral parol agreement in making its determination that the 
Lease was not a valid document between the parties. 
Similar to Henderson, supra, a collateral parol agreement was created by the parties 
that the Lease herein would only become effective on certain conditions or contingencies. 
Such agreement was not an oral contradiction or variation on the written instrument, but went 
to the very existence of the contract, evidencing that no binding and effective contract ever 
existed. In Henderson, the agreement was not binding until bids and a down payment had 
been received. In the instant matter, the Lease was not to be valid unless Petitioner passed 
away. Additionally, the 10th Circuit acknowledged that the trial court's findings were 
supported by evidence and not clearly erroneous, so those findings were binding upon the 
10th Circuit in its determination. Both parties in this matter submitted the evidence through 
their testimonies as to the collateral parol agreement, sufficiently supporting the trial court's 
findings that the Lease was not intended to be a valid and binding contract either between 
the parties and not until Petitioner passed away and Respondent's siblings attempted to take 
Respondent's interests in the property at issue. 
Similar to Cimarron, supra, the collateral parol agreement created between the parties 
herein does not impugn the integrity of the writings to which they relate and are thus 
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admissible to show "a condition precedent to the taking effect of the engagements therein/9 
Ibid, 234 F.2d 262, 263 (C.A.10 Okla. 1956). The actual terms of the Lease were not at 
issue herein. The parties intended them, as they were in writing, to govern the property 
interests contained therein, conditioned upon the death of Petitioner and the challenge to the 
Respondent's interest therein by the siblings. Absent these conditions, Petitioner never 
intended for Respondent to take possession of the property. Petitioner was not leasing the 
property to Respondent during the time he was alive. 
The 10th Circuit has also addressed the issue of integration, which appears to be the 
crux of the Utah Court of Appeals' Opinion in this matter. The 10th Circuit stated that, "oral 
testimony showing the terms and conditions under which a written contract shall become 
effective is not integrated in the written contract if the writings of the parties are silent with 
respect thereto and the oral proof is not inconsistent with such writings." Dayvault v. Baruch 
Oil Corp.. 231 F.2d 413,414 (C.A. 10 Wy. 1956); see Annotation 70 A.L.R. 752; 20 Am.Jur. 
Evidence, §§ 1135,1136, 1137, 1138-1140. In the instant matter, the Lease itself does not 
mention anything with respect to the time frame or conditions under which it was to become 
effective, hence such evidence was offered by testimony of both parties at the trial in this 
matter. Such testimony did not contravene the terms of the written Lease itself and, in fact, 
the parties agree that the terms were their intent with certain conditions and contingencies 
as to it becoming effective, namely, that Petitioner would pass away or the siblings would 
attempt to take Respondent's interest in the property. Thus, this evidence was not integrated 
into the written Lease and is admissible as parol evidence to show the existence of a valid 
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or binding contract, so long as it remains consistent with the terms of the Lease, as argued 
supra. 
The Utah Court of Appeals erroneously determined the matter based strictly on the 
parol evidence rule as determinative, by stating that the clause is clear and unambiguous 
despite the concession by both parties sworn testimony that the Lease was not intended to be 
recorded and enforced unless certain factors occurred. This evidence was clearly both 
"relevant" and "credible" and thus, properly admitted by the trial court in its determination 
as to integration. See, Gillmor. The fact that both parties agreed to it clearly overcomes the 
presumption. 
The trial court amply applied the parol evidence rule as it should be, as an initial 
inquiry rather than determinative; however, the Utah Court of Appeals strictly applied the 
parol evidence rule and erroneously determined that the trial court somehow used this 
evidence to amended the language of the Lease. As argued supra, the terms of the Lease 
were not altered by the evidence that it was not intended to be valid absent the death of 
Petitioner or a challenge to Respondent's interests by his siblings. 
The Court of Appeals failed to recognize the trial court's Order as being one of a 
determination as to whether a contract existed between the parties rather than whether the 
terms of such a contract were ambiguous. The United States 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 
stated it best when it determined that the parol evidence rule "presupposes an action based 
on a valid contract; and if the issue is as to the existence or validity of the alleged contract, 
the rule, by its very terms, has no application." Baskin Distribution, Inc. v. Pittway Corp., 
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141 F.3d 1173 (Table) (C.A.9 (Wash.), 1998). The trial court correctly concluded, based on 
both parties testimonies, that the Lease was not intended as a binding contract between 
Petitioner and Respondent, but only for the purpose of protecting Respondent should 
something happen to Petitioner and Respondent's siblings tried to take an interest in the 
property. Since neither of the conditions were met, Respondent's recording of the Lease did 
not automatically validate it as a binding agreement between the parties. According to this 
Court and various other state and federal jurisdictions cited supra, not only was the trial court 
correct in admitting such evidence, it was required to do so in order to determine the 
threshold issue of whether a valid contract even existed, particularly given the silence of the 
Lease itself with respect to such a matter. 
The Utah Court of Appeals' application of the parol evidence rule to this matter was 
thus misplaced. The matter at issue herein pertained to a collateral parol agreement, 
necessary to the determination of whether a valid contract existed. The parol evidence rule 
has no application until the court determines that a valid contract exists, hence the evidence 
admitted and appropriately relied upon by the trial court in this matter as to the existence of 
the contract was admissible and the trial court's Order should be affirmed. 
[remainder of page left intentionally blank] 
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CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully requests that this 
Court enter an order overturning the Opinion rendered in this matter by the Utah Court of 
Appeals, dated December 29,2006, and affirm the trial court's Order. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of June, 2007. 
Craig C 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of June, 2007, I mailed, first class, postage 
prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner/Appellant on Grant 
of Certiorari to the following: 
MATTHEW P. JUBE, Esq. 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Attorneys for Rodney Tangren 
75 South 300 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Addendum ~A~ 
Opinion, 
dated December 29, 2006 
Fage 2 ol7 
~ P . 3 d ~ -
... P.3d —, 2006 WL 3842111 (Utah App.), 2006 UT App 515 
(Cite as: — P.3d —) 
Page 1 
Tangren Family Trust ex rel. Tangren v. 
TangrenUtah App.,2006. 
NOTICE: TfflS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN 
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE 
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL 
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
TANGREN FAMILY TRUST, by Richard 
TANGREN, Trustee, and Richard Tangren, 
Individually, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Rodney TANGREN, Defendant and Appellant 
No. 20050085-CA. 
Dec. 29,2006. 
Background: Landlord sued tenant alleging breach 
of lease and seeking damages and eviction. After 
bench trial, the Seventh District Court, Monticello 
Department, Lyle R. Anderson, J., ruled that the 
lease was not intended to govern the relationship 
between the landlord and the tenant, invalidated the 
lease, and ordered tenant off the property. Tenant 
appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Bench, P.J., held 
that: 
(1) lease was fully-integrated contract against which 
parol evidence was not admissible, and 
(2) lease was not ambiguous. 
Reversed and remanded. 
[1] Appeal and Error 30 €=>842(8) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(8) k. Review Where 
Evidence Consists of Documents. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence 157 €=>397(2) 
157 Evidence 
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting 
Writings 
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding 
to Terms of Written Instrument 
157k397 Contracts in General 
157k397(2) k. Completeness of 
Writing and Presumption in Relation Thereto; 
Integration. Most Cited Cases 
A trial court's determination as to whether a 
contract is integrated is a question of fact subject to 
the clearly erroneous standard of review. 
A trial court's determination as to whether a 
contract is integrated is a question of fact subject to 
the clearly erroneous standard of review. 
[2J Appeal and Error 30 €=>842(8) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(8) k. Review Where 
Evidence Consists of Documents. Most Cited Cases 
Contracts 95 €=>176(2) 
95 Contracts 
9511 Construction and Operation 
9511(A) General Rules of Construction 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Page 3 of7 
— P.3d — Page 2 
— P.3d —,2006 WL 3842111 (Utah App.), 2006 UT App 515 
(Cite as: — P.3d—) 
95kl76 Questions for Jury 
95kl76(2) k. Ambiguity in General. 
Most Cited Cases 
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of 
law (hat is reviewed for correctness. 
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of 
law that is reviewed for correctness. 
[3] Evidence 157 €=>397(1) 
157 Evidence 
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting 
Writings 
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding 
to Terms of Written Instrument 
157k397 Contracts in General 
157k397(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
In the absence of fraud, the parol evidence rule 
excludes contemporaneous conversations, 
statements, or representations, offered for the 
purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an 
integrated contract. 
[41 Evidence 157 €=»397(1) 
157 Evidence 
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting 
Writings 
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding 
to Terms of Written Instrument 
157k397 Contracts in General 
157k397(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Evidence 157 C=>448 
157 Evidence 
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting 
Writings 
157XI(D) Construction or Application of 
Language of Written Instrument 
157k448 k. Grounds for Admission of 
Extrinsic Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
The application of the parol evidence rule involves 
two steps: (1) the court must consider whether the 
agreement is integrated, and (2) if the court finds 
that the agreement is integrated, then parol evidence 
may be admitted only if the court makes a 
subsequent determination that the language of the 
agreement is ambiguous. 
[5] Evidence 157 €=>397(2) 
157 Evidence 
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting 
Writings 
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding 
to Terms of Written Instrument 
157k397 Contracts in General 
157k397(2) k. Completeness of 
Writing and Presumption in Relation Thereto; 
Integration. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence 157 €==>448 
157 Evidence 
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting 
Writings 
157XI(D) Construction or Application of 
Language of Written Instrument 
157k448 k. Grounds for Admission of 
Extrinsic Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
Any relevant evidence, including parol evidence, is 
admissible in the preliminary determination of 
integration of a contract; courts must, however, 
apply a rebuttable presumption that a writing which 
on its face appears to be an integrated agreement is 
what it appears to be. 
[6] Evidence 157 €=>393(1) 
157 Evidence 
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting 
Writings 
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding 
to Terms of Written Instrument 
157k393 Leases 
157k393(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Lease of land was a Mly-integrated contract against 
which parol evidence was not admissible at trial on 
landlord's breach of contract and eviction claim, 
even though landlord testified that the purpose of 
the lease was simply to protect the tenant from the 
interests of his siblings in the property after the 
landlord's death; integration clause clearly stated 
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that the lease was the entire agreement governing 
the relationship between landlord and tenant and 
concerning the land. 
[7] Evidence 157 €=»448 
157 Evidence 
157X1 Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting 
Writings 
157XI(D) Construction or Application of 
Language of Written Instrument 
157k448 k. Grounds for Admission of 
Extrinsic Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
Lease of land was not ambiguous, as required for 
admission of parol evidence in determining validity 
of lease, even though landlord testified that lease 
was intended only to protect tenant from interests of 
his siblings in the property after death of landlord, 
given that landlord's parol evidence only explained 
landlord's subjective reasons for entering the lease, 
and parol evidence did not uncover any ambiguity 
in the lease. 
Seventh District, Monticello Department, 
020700046; The Honorable Lyle R. Anderson. 
Matthew P. Jube, Provo, for Appellant. 
Craig C. Halls, Blanding, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BENCH, BILLINGS, and DAVIS. 
OPINION (For Official Publication) 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
*1 1 1 Rodney Tangren (Defendant) appeals the 
decision of the trial court invalidating a lease 
agreement between Defendant and his father 
Richard Tangren (Plaintiff). We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
1 2 This dispute arose out of the joint efforts of 
Plaintiff and Defendant to develop 135 acres of 
unimproved land (the Land) near the Colorado 
River into a dude ranch. In 1981, Plaintiff 
purchased the Land from the State Institutional 
Trust Lands and the Bureau of Land Management. 
The Land has since been held in trust by the 
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Tangren Family Trust, of which Plaintiff is the 
trustee and Defendant is a beneficiary. 
t 3 In the years following his purchase of the 
Land, Plaintiff commenced work on the dude ranch. 
He built a two-story structure with a basement and 
blasted areas out of the side of the mountain, 
complete with connecting tunnels, to be used as 
storage areas and potential guest quarters. Plaintiff 
also created recreational amenities on the Land, 
including a baseball diamond, a shooting range, an 
airplane runway, and horse corrals. Plaintiff enlisted 
Defendant to help in developing the Land into a 
commercially viable dude ranch, keeping Defendant 
on the payroll of Plaintiffs fencing company while 
Defendant worked on the Land. 
f 4 Defendant eventually became concerned that 
his investment of capital and time could be lost 
once the dude ranch became profitable. He worried 
that his siblings, also beneficiaries of the Tangren 
Family Trust, would attempt to take away his stake 
in the project. In 1992, responding to Defendants 
concerns, Plaintiff prepared, and both parties 
entered into, a lease agreement (the Lease). Under 
the terms of the Lease, Plaintiff leased the Land to 
Defendant for a period of ninety-nine years. The 
Lease was re-executed in 1994 with the only 
difference being the deletion of Defendant's wife as 
a named lessee. The Lease required Defendant to 
pay Plaintiff $275 per month, which covered rent, 
taxes, and insurance. Both the 1992 lease and the 
1994 lease included the same integration clause, 
stating that the Lease contained "the entire 
understanding between the parties with respect to its 
subject-matter, the [Land] and all aspects of the 
relationship between Lessee and Lessor." 
Defendant recorded the Lease in 2001, after 
Defendant's relationship with Plaintiff deteriorated. 
In 2002, after sending multiple notices of default, 
Plaintiff filed a complaint in district court seeking 
to evict Defendant from the Land and to recover 
damages under the terms of the Lease. Defendant 
claimed that he was not in default because he paid 
the rent in cash and even tendered checks to cover 
any unpaid balance. 
t 5 At trial, the court considered extrinsic evidence 
concerning the intent of the parties in creating the 
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Lease. Plaintiff claimed that Defendant was in 
default or, in the alternative, that the Lease was 
created only to protect Defendant's interest from the 
other Tangren Family Trust beneficiaries should 
Plaintiff pass away. Further, Plaintiff testified that 
the Lease was not to be recorded prior to Plaintiffs 
death. Defendant claimed that the parties intended 
the Lease to be an enforceable contract and that he 
had not breached it. Following a three-day bench 
trial, the court issued an order invalidating the 
Lease. The trial court found that the Lease was 
created only to prevent Defendant's siblings from 
encroaching on Defendant's investment and that the 
Lease was not meant to govern the relationship 
between Plaintiff and Defendant. The trial court 
therefore ordered Defendant off the Land and 
provided for the timely removal of Defendant's 
personal property. Defendant now appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
*2 [1][2] f 6 The parties have raised multiple 
issues that stem from the trial court's interpretation 
of the Lease. A trial court's determination as to 
whether a contract is integrated is a question of fact. 
See Cantamar, LLC. v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 
321,1 11, 142 P.3d 140; Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 
638 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 1981). Whether a 
contract is ambiguous is a question of law. See 
WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 
2002 UT 88,f 22, 54 P.3d 1139; Winegar v. 
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). We 
review questions of feet under the clearly erroneous 
standard and questions of law for correctness. See 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,935-36 (Utah 1994). 
ANALYSIS 
[3][4][5] % 1 Defendant claims that the Lease is a 
valid, enforceable agreement that governs the 
parties' interests in the Land, and that the court 
impermissibly considered parol evidence in 
invalidating the Lease. In the absence of fraud, the 
parol evidence rule excludes "contemporaneous 
conversations, statements, or representations, 
offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the 
terms of an integrated contract." Union Bank v. 
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Swenson, 707 P.2d 663,665 (Utah 1985). 
The application of the parol evidence rule involves 
two steps. First, the court must consider whether the 
agreement is integrated. If the court finds [that] the 
agreement is integrated, then parol evidence may be 
admitted only if the court makes a subsequent 
determination that the language of the agreement is 
ambiguous. 
Hall v. Process Instruments & Control Inc., 890 
P.2d 1024, 1027 (Utah 1995). Any relevant 
evidence, including parol evidence, is admissible in 
the preliminary determination of integration. Courts 
must, however, "apply a rebuttable presumption that 
a writing which on its face appears to be an 
integrated agreement is what it appears to be." 
Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 665. 
I. Integration 
f 8 Defendant claims that the trial court erred in 
using extrinsic evidence to invalidate the Lease.™1 
Though the question of integration is a question of 
fact for which the trial court may consider any 
relevant evidence, see id, the party challenging the 
application of the parol evidence rule must 
overcome the presumption that a "writing which on 
its face appears to be an integrated agreement is 
what it appears to be." Id. The agreement in the 
instant case includes an integration clause titled " 
Entire Agreement," which states that the Lease 
contains the entire understanding between the 
parties with respect to the Land and to the 
lessor-lessee relationship. The supreme court has 
recently reiterated the importance and purpose of 
integration clauses in contracts: 
[Integration] clauses are routinely incorporated in 
agreements in order to signal to the courts that the 
parties agree that the contract is to be considered 
completely integrated.... [T]he purpose and effect of 
including [an integration] clause is to preclude the 
subsequent introduction of evidence of preliminary 
negotiations or of side agreements in a proceeding 
in which a court interprets the document. 
*3 Ford v. American Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 
2004 UT 70,1 28, 98 P.3d 15 (quotations and 
citation omitted). Here, the record reflects that 
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Plaintiff worked closely with his attorneys during 
the drafting of the Lease. Plaintiff testified that he 
went against his attorneys' advice in altering some 
of the terms of the Lease after it was drafted and 
prior to having Defendant sign, including the 
unusually long term of the Lease and the low 
monthly rental payment schedule. In both the 1992 
lease and the 1994 lease, Plaintiff included the same 
integration clause. 
[6] 1 9 At trial, Plaintiff testified that he intended 
the Lease to become effective only to protect 
Defendant from his siblings in the event of 
Plaintiffs death. This testimony is the sole evidence 
on which the trial court could have based its ruling 
that the Lease was invalid. Utah law has a stated 
preference for gleaning the intent of contracting 
parties, "whenever possible, from written 
documents rather than from self-serving testimony." 
Glauser Storage, LLC. v. Smedley, 2001 UT App 
141,1 20, 27 P.3d 565; see also Lee v. Barnes, 
1999 UT App 126,f 9, 977 P.2d 550. Plaintiff has 
not overcome the presumption of integration. See 
Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 665. The lease in question 
contains a clear and unambiguous integration 
clause, the purpose of which is to "preclude the 
subsequent introduction of evidence of preliminary 
negotiations or of side agreements." Ford, 2004 UT 
70 at 1 28, 98 P.3d 15 (quotations and citation 
omitted). While the trial court could consider 
Plaintiffs testimony regarding his intent in creating 
the Lease, the court erred in relying on that 
testimony in the face of a clear and unambiguous 
integration clause in the Lease itself. See Cantamar, 
2006 UT App 321 at 1 11, 142 P.3d 140. We 
therefore hold that the trial court's findings as to 
integration were clearly erroneous. The Lease is an 
integrated agreement, against which parol evidence 
may not be admitted absent some ambiguity in the 
teims of the Lease. See Hall, 890 P.2d at 1027. 
II. Ambiguity 
1 10 Because we hold that the Lease is an 
integrated agreement, we now consider whether the 
Lease contains any ambiguities that would justify 
the trial court's decision to consider the parol 
evidence offered by the parties. Despite neither 
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party arguing that the language of the Lease creates 
any ambiguity, we discuss ambiguity in order to 
complete the two-step analysis discussed in Hall: " 
If the court finds [that] the agreement is integrated, 
then parol evidence may be admitted only if the 
court makes a subsequent determination that the 
language of the agreement is ambiguous." Id. As 
with the initial inquiry into the question of 
integration, some cases have permitted the 
consideration of any relevant evidence in 
determining whether a contract is ambiguous. See 
Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 
264, 268 (Utah 1995); Cantamar, 2006 UT App 
321 at 1 26, 142 P.3d 140; Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 
UT App 351,1 35, 121 P.3d 57 (rejecting "the 
strict application of the 'four comers' rule, which 
limits the boundaries of inquiry into whether an 
ambiguity exists in a contract to the contract's 'four 
corners' "). If the court then concludes, in light of 
all the credible relevant evidence, that the contract 
language is indeed ambiguous, parties may be 
allowed to introduce extrinsic evidence to resolve 
any ambiguities. See Cantamar, 2006 UT App 321 
at 1 27, 142 P.3d 140. "Conversely, if after 
considering such evidence, the court determines that 
the language of the contract is not ambiguous, then 
the parties' intentions must be determined solely 
from the language of the contract." Id. (quotations 
and citation omitted). 
*4 [7] 1 11 We distinguish the instant case from 
the Ward line of cases above. The proffered 
extrinsic evidence in those cases helped uncover 
ambiguities in the text of the agreements that may 
not have been obvious on their face. In our case, the 
proffered extrinsic evidence addresses only 
Plaintiffs subjective reasons for entering into the 
Lease and does not help uncover any ambiguity in 
the Lease itself. The language of the Lease is clear 
and not "capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of uncertain terms, missing 
terms, or other facial deficiencies." Winegar v. 
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991) 
(quotations and citation omitted). Because the 
Lease is unambiguous, the trial court improperly 
allowed Plaintiffs testimony to modify the terms of 
the Lease. 
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III. Breach Tangren Family Trust ex rel. Tangren v. Tangren 
... p.3d ----, 2006 WL 3842111 (Utah App.), 2006 
% 12 At trial, the court admitted testimony and UT App 515 
evidence concerning Defendant's possible breach of 
the Lease, specifically Defendant's duty to pay END OF DOCUMENT 
monthly rent to Plaintiff. The trial court expressly 
found that Defendant did not make the monthly 
cash payments he claimed to have made to Plaintiff 
during a period of several years. But the trial court 
has not made findings of fact and conclusions of 
law concerning the larger payments allegedly made 
by check. We therefore remand the case for further 
proceedings, consistent with this opinion, to 
determine whether Defendant in feet breached the 
unambiguous terms of the Lease. 
CONCLUSION 
t 13 Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a valid, 
integrated, and unambiguous lease agreement. 
Though the trial court could consider extrinsic 
evidence to determine whether the Lease was in fact 
integrated, the trial court's implicit finding that the 
contract was not integrated was clearly erroneous. 
The presumption favoring a finding of integration 
is, in this case, strengthened by the presence of a 
clear and unambiguous integration clause in the 
Lease from which the trial court should have 
gleaned the parties' intent. Such an integration 
clause weighs heavily in favor of a finding that the 
agreement of which it is a part is integrated. Finally, 
the trial court did not make a sufficient 
determination of breach. 
f 14 We therefore reverse and remand the case for 
further proceedings concerning Defendant's alleged 
breach of the Lease. 
1 15 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, 
Judge and JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge. 
FN1. The trial court's invalidation of the 
Lease based on extrinsic evidence includes 
the implicit determination that the 
agreement was not integrated and therefore 
was subject to modification via extrinsic 
evidence. 
UtahApp.,2006. 
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Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Telephone: (435)678-3333 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Juan County 
" * D JAN 1 2 2005 
CU3RK OF THE COURT 
BY. 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE TANGREN FAMILY TRUST, 
by RICHARD TANGREN, TRUSTEE and 
RICHARD TANGREN, individually. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
ORDER 
Civil No. 0207-46 
RODNEY TANGREN, 
Defendant. 
THIS MATTER came before the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson on 
the 25th day of August, 2004. Plaintiff Richard Tangren, 
individually and as trustee, was present and represented by Craig 
C. Halls; Defendant Rodney Tangren was present and represented by 
Matthew Jube. This trial was suspended at the close of the first 
day of testimony and the parties returned on the 17th day of 
November, 2004, and the balance of the testimony was received by 
the court; both parties were present and represented by counsel 
as above stated. The Court having received all of the evidence 
1 
and having observed all of the witnesses, taken their testimony 
and reviewed the exhibits, now makes the following 
FINDINGS OP PACT 
1* The center of the dispute was a Lease dated in 1992 and 
apparently signed by Richard Tangren, Paula Tangren and Rodney 
Tangren. 
2. There was evidence that Paula Tangren's name had been 
removed from the lease and from the notary certificate and the 
lease had been resigned and notarized in 1994, with the 
signatures of Richard Tangren and Rodney Tangren. 
3. The deletion of Mrs. Tangren#s name in 1994 was 
apparently done without objection of the Defendant. 
4. The Lease was recorded in 2001 after a falling out 
between Richard Tangren and Rodney Tangren. 
5. From 1992 until the lease was filed in 2001, Richard 
Tangren had been able to come and go from the subject property as 
he pleased. 
6. There was disputed testimony as to whether or not the 
lease was delivered when signed in 1992 or 1994, or whether it 
was delivered prior to being recorded in 2001. 
7. The court believes that where testimony was 
contradictory, the testimony of Richard Tangren was more 
2 
U 
transparent and, therefore, the Court believed it to be more 
truthful. 
8. The Court finds that the Defendant, and more 
particularly his wife, was more meticulous in the records she 
kept with regard to expenses or expenditures on the ranch 
property, yet made no record of payments on the lease. 
Therefore, the Court finds that there were no cash payments made 
for the period of 1992 through the present. 
9. The Court finds that the lease was prepared at the 
behest of Richard Tangren, that he had advice of counsel with 
regard to its terms and went against the advice of counsel. The 
Court finds that his actions against the counsel of his attorneys 
in the execution and content of the lease is an indication of his 
effort to make a concession to Rodney Tangren and that the 
agreement would not come into effect unless there was a quarrel 
or dispute with the Tangren siblings. 
10. The Court finds that based upon the foregoing, the 
document noted in this litigation as the "Lease" was intended as 
a protection against an incursion upon the Defendant by his 
siblings and was not intended to govern actions as between 
Richard Tangren and Rodney Tangren and both parties agreed and 
3 
understood that it would only take effect if challenged by 
Rodney's siblings. 
11. The Court finds that the "Lease" is not a valid 
document. 
12. The Court finds that Rodney Tangren knew the "Lease" 
was not intended as a functioning agreement between the Tangren 
Trust and Defendant and was intended to protect Rodney from 
incursions or challenges by his siblings. 
13. The Court finds that there was no reliance on the lease 
document as a valid and binding lease by Rodney Tangren. 
14. As the Court has found the lease to be invalid, there 
was no requirement to pay rent and thereby no rent is due from 
Rodney Tangren to Richard Tangren. 
15. The Court finds that Rodney Tangren knew that the 
agreement was not between he and Richard, but was to protect him 
from his siblings and therefore, there was no fraud which induced 
him or caused any damage to Rodney. 
16. With regard to the Defendant's unjust enrichment claim, 
the Court does not find sufficient evidence to show that he 
improved the property. The value or evidence on expenditures was 
just to maintain the property and did not increase the value of 
the property. 
4 
17. The Court finds that there was no damage upon Rodney's 
removal of the blinds from -the property because there was no 
evidence that the value of the property was diminished and the 
carpet may have been replaced in any event. 
18. The Court finds that there was insufficient evidence to 
determine damages under the Defendant's Counterclaims. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The claim of Richard Tangren for rents is denied and no 
sum is awarded therefor. 
2. The counterclaim of Rodney Tangren for unjust enrichment 
is denied and no sum is awarded therefor. 
3* The claim of Rodney Tangren for specific performance is 
denied and no sum is awarded therefor. 
4* The claim of Rodney Tangren for reliance damages is 
denied and no sum is awarded therefor. 
5« The claim of Rodney Tangren for fraud is denied and no 
sum is awarded therefor. 
6. The Defendant may remove his personal property from the 
premises and shall have six months, until May 18, 2005, to remove 
said property or the same shall be forever forfeited. 
7« Any items which have become fixtures to the property 
shall remain on the property. 
5 
8. Each of the parties shall pay their own costs and 
attorney fees incurred in pursuance of this action. 
DATED this fflU day of J^W^vfr 2005. 
Approved as to form 
and content: 
MATTHEW JUBE 
Attorney for Defendant 
BY THE COURT: 
ICT JUDGE /IS / <&&t-^ 
ITJUDGE c — ^ " ^ 
m 
$. Bach of the parties shall pay their cum costs and 
attorney feet incurred in pursuance of this action. 
DMfeD this -„ day of . 2005. 
•x t m COORTI 
DISTRICT JUDOS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Baskin Distribution, Inc. v. Pittway Corporation, 
141 F.3d 1173 (C.A.9 Wash. 1998) 
(Unpublished Opinion) 
yskstwm 
141 F.3d 1173 Pagel 
141 F.3d 1173, 1998 W L 101691 (C.A.9 (Wash.)) 
(Cite as: 141 F.3d 1173) 
C 
Baskin Distribution, Inc. v. Pittway Corp. 
C.A.9 (Wash.), 1998. 
NOTICE: THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 
OPINION.(The Court's decision is referenced in a " 
Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions" 
appearing in the Federal Reporter. Use FICTA9 
Rule 36-3 for rules regarding the citation of 
unpublished opinions.) 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. 
BASKIN DISTRIBUTION, INC, 
Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant, 
v. 
PITTWAY CORPORATION, a Delaware 
Corporation, successor in interest to Apex Security 
Alarm Products, Inc., Defendant 
-Counter-Claimant-Appellee. 
No. 96-35882. 
D.C. No. CV-95-01033-BJR. 
Decided March 9, 1998. 
Argued and Submitted December 4,1997 Seattle 
Washington. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Washington, Barbara J. 
Rothstein, Chief Judge, Presiding. 
Before REAVLEY,FN**GOODWIN and 
KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges. 
FN** Honorable Thomas M. Reavley, 
Senior United States Circuit Judge for the 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth 
Circuit, sitting by designation. 
MEMORANDUMS 
FN* This disposition is not appropriate for 
publication and may not be cited to or by 
the courts of this circuit except as provided 
by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. 
*1 Baskin Distribution, Inc. ("BDI"), a Washington 
based distributor of residential and commercial 
security systems, appeals the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Pittway Corporation, 
purchaser of the assets of Apex Security Company ( 
"Apex"). BDI filed suit alleging that Apex 
breached a contract granting BDI exclusive 
distribution of security systems for Apex. Finding 
that no contract was ever formed, we affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Apex, located in North Carolina, manufactured 
home security devices that it distributed via 
exclusive distributors. In late 1994 continuing 
through mid-1995, Christopher Baskin, President of 
BDI and David Hanchette, Apex Director of Sales 
and Marketing, negotiated for BDI to become an 
Apex exclusive distributor for certain western 
regions. On May 8, 1995, Hanchette brought 
Baskin a proposed 24-month exclusive distribution 
agreement which was prepared for signature. 
When Hanchette left to return to North Carolina, 
Baskin had three unresolved objections to the 
distribution agreement. The minor objections 
concerned Baskin's wish to increase the periods for 
payment and for cure after notification of default 
from 30 to 60 days. The major unresolved issue 
was whether Baskin would be allowed to participate 
when Apex directly sold to "national account" 
customers. On May 9, 1995, Baskin made three 
handwritten changes concerning these issues to the 
proposed agreement, initialed each change, and 
signed the agreement. On that day, Baskin mailed 
the signed agreement to Apex, along with a cover 
letter noting the modifications to the agreement and 
requesting Hanchette to initial and date the changes. 
Also on May 9, 1995, BDI placed an order for 
products from Apex. Apex shipped this initial 
stocking order in two installments on May 10 and 
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May 18, 1995. BDI alleges that it had already 
begun distributing Apex advertising materials and 
receiving Apex product orders in May 1995, and 
that when customers from its geographical area 
called Apex regarding products they were referred 
to BDI. BDI has yet to pay for the initial stocking 
order. 
On May 12, 1995, Pittway purchased all the assets 
of Apex. The distribution agreement with BDI was 
not listed as one of the specified liabilities Pittway 
assumed pursuant to the purchase agreement. On 
June 23, 1995, Pittway sent a letter to Baskin 
informing him that Pittway had decided to sell its 
Apex products directly to installing dealers 
bypassing exclusive distributors. Pittway offered 
to buy back any Apex products that BDI had not yet 
sold. 
BDI filed suit in July 1995, claiming breach of 
contract and fraud. Apex counterclaimed against 
BDI for BDI's failure to pay for the initial stocking 
order shipped on May 9, 1995. BDI asserts that 
Pittway's counterclaim should be set-off against 
BDI's contractual damages claim. The district 
court summarily dismissed BDI's breach of contract 
claim and fraud charge, and denied BDI's motion 
for reconsideration. The court, in its thorough 
order, held that a reasonable jury could not find that 
the parties ever formed an exclusive distribution 
contract or that the actions of BDI and Apex 
constituted confirmation of such an agreement 
under the "merchant's confirmation" exception to 
the statute of frauds. The court also held that 
because no enforceable distribution contract was 
formed, the May 9, 1995 order constituted a single 
separate agreement, thus holding BDI liable for the 
price of the goods ordered and received regardless 
of the outcome of the breach of contract claim. 
BDI appeals the dismissal of its breach of contract 
claim and the grant of Apex's crossclaim summary 
judgment motion. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review 
*2 This court reviews a grant of summary judgment 
de novo.™1 The court must determine, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine 
issues of material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and whether 
the district court correctly applied the relevant 
substantive law.™2 We must not weigh the 
evidence or determine the truth of the matters 
asserted but must only determine whether there is a 
genuine issue for trial.™3 The district court's 
grant of summary judgment may be affirmed if it is 
supported by any ground in the record, whether or 
not the district court relied upon that ground.™4 
FN1. Summers v. A. Teichert & Son, Inc., 
Ill F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir.1997) 
(citations omitted); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. 
v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 
F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir.1987). 
FN2. Id. 
FN3.M 
FN4. Sicor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 
848, 860 n. 17 (9th Cir. 1995). 
B. Choice of Law 
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C. 
") governs the alleged distribution agreement 
between BDI and Apex because the agreement 
primarily involves the sale of goods.™5 
FN5. See Glacier Optical, Inc. v. Optique 
Du Monde, Ltd., 816 F.Supp. 646, 653 
(D.Or.1993), affd, 46 F.3d 1141 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (finding under Washington law, 
an alleged oral agreement to distribute 
eyewear was governed by Wash.Rev.Code 
Ann. § 62A.2-201); see also American 
Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Bill Kummer, Inc., 
65 F.3d 1381, 1385-86 (7th Cir.1995) 
(finding distributorship agreement as 
predominantly contract for sale of goods); 
Babst v. FMC Corp., 661 F.Supp. 82, 
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87-88 (S.D.Miss.1986) (same). The 
Uniform Commercial code as adopted in 
Washington is found at Wash.Rev.Code 
Ann. Title 62A. 
BDI argues that the district court erred in applying 
Washington law instead of North Carolina law 
because the Apex distribution agreement provides 
for the application of North Carolina law in regard 
to "the legal relations between the parties." This 
court will engage in a choice of law analysis only 
when an actual conflict exists between Washington 
law and the law of another state. ™6 Both 
Washington and North Carolina have adopted 
Section 2-201 of the U.C.C. dealing with the statute 
of frauds.™7 We see no significant difference 
between the Washington and North Carolina law 
affecting this dispute. 
FN6. Rice v. 
Wash.2d 205, 
(Wash.1994). 
Dow Chem. Co., 124 
875 P.2d 1213, 1216 
FN7. N.C.Gen.Stat. § 25-2-201 
(1994-1996); Wash.Rev.Code Ann. § 
62A.2-201 (West 1997). 
B. Promissory Estoppel 
BDI argues that the doctrine of promissory estoppel 
prohibits Pittway from asserting the statute of 
frauds. BDI relies on Klinke v. Famous Recipe 
Fried Chicken, Inc., in which the defendant induced 
the plaintiff to leave his employ in Alaska and move 
to Washington to establish a food franchise.™8 
Although the defendant in Klinke promised the 
plaintiff that the defendant would qualify and 
register in Washington as a dealer in franchises, he 
never did. The Washington Supreme Court 
construed the Restatement of Contracts section 178 
comment f, which states that a promise to make a 
memorandum, if relied upon, "may give rise to an 
effective promissory estoppel if the Statute (of 
Frauds) would otherwise operate to defraud." 
Applying this language, the Klinke court concluded 
that on a motion for summary judgment, when facts 
are asserted which show that a promise was made to 
make and execute a written agreement, comment f 
allows an action for breach of contract 
notwithstanding the statute of frauds.™9 BDI 
argues that, like the plaintiff in Klinke, it has 
sufficient evidence to show that Apex promised to 
execute the distribution agreement, and therefore, 
BDI has an action based upon promissory estoppel 
if Pittway breached its subsequent promise to 
reduce the contract to an enforceable writing.™10 
FN8. 94 Wash.2d 255, 616 P.2d 644 
(Wash.l980)(enbanc). 
FN9. 616 P.2d at 646-47. 
FN 10. The purpose of promissory estoppel 
is "to make a promise binding, under 
certain circumstances, without 
consideration in the usual sense of 
something bargained for and given in 
exchange. If the promisee's performance 
was requested at the time the promisor 
made his promise and that performance 
was bargained for, the doctrine is 
inapplicable." Id. at 648 n. 4 (quoting 
Raedeke v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
10 Cal.3d 665, 111 Cal.Rptr. 693, 517 
P.2d 1157, 1161 (Cal. 1974)). 
*3 The Washington Supreme court, however, in 
Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil of California, 
expressly distinguished the statute of frauds at issue 
in Klinke from the statute of frauds contained within 
the U.C.C..™11 
FN11. Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co. 
of Cal., 96 Wash.2d 291, 635 P.2d 103, 
105(Wash.l981)(enbanc). 
In interpreting and applying the statute of frauds 
under California law, this court has held that 
promissory estoppel cannot render an oral promise 
otherwise within the statute of frauds enforceable. 
™
12
 The Lige Dickson court adopted this view 
holding that "promissory estoppel cannot be used to 
overcome the statute of frauds in a case which 
involves the sale of goods.™13 Although the court 
recognized that the Restatement "authorizes 
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enforcement of a promise which induced action or 
forbearance by a promisee notwithstanding the 
statute of frauds," it declined to apply this policy to 
the sale of goods and circumvent the U.C.C..™14 
The Washington Supreme Court noted that the 
U.C.C. was designed in the hope that "commercial 
transactions could take place across state 
boundaries without the stultifying effect caused by 
differences in states' laws." ¥Nl5 Thus, the court 
decided to "join the other courts which limit the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel from overcoming a 
valid defense based on the statute of frauds 
contained within the Uniform Commercial Code." 
^ ^ North Carolina courts have limited denying a 
defense of the statute of frauds to situations in 
which a plaintiff demonstrated that the defendant 
acted fraudulently or in bad faith. "The North 
Carolina courts have recognized to a limited extent 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel, but have not 
expressly recognized it in all situations.... The 
North Carolina cases which have applied the 
doctrine have only done so in a defensive situation, 
where there has been an intended abandonment of 
an existing right by the promisee. North Carolina 
case law has not approved the doctrine for 
affirmative relief." ^^ 
FN12. CR. Fedrick, Inc. v. Borg-Warner 
Corp., 552 F.2d 852, 856-57 (9th Cir.1977) 
FN13. Lige Dickson, 635 P.2d at 107. 
FN14.Matl05. 
FN15.A/. atl07. 
FN16.M 
FN 17. Home Electric Co. of Lenoir, Inc. v. 
Hall & Under down Heating & Air 
Conditioning Co., 86 N.C.App. 540, 358 
S.E.2d 539, 541 (N.C.App. 1987), affd 322 
N.C. 107, 366 S.E.2d441 (N.C.App. 1988). 
We affirm the district court's holding against BDI's 
promissory estoppel claim. 
C Merchant's Exception Under the Statute of 
Frauds 
The Merchant's exception of the statute of frauds 
provides that the statute will be satisfied between 
merchants, "if within a reasonable time a writing in 
confirmation of the contract and sufficient against 
the sender is received and the party receiving it has 
reason to know of its contents." FNU Under such 
circumstances, the writing "satisfies the 
requirements of [a writing] against such party unless 
written notice of objection to its contents is given 
within ten days after it is received." ¥Nl9 The 
failure to answer a written confirmation of a 
contract within ten days of receipt effectively takes 
away from the party who fails to answer the defense 
of the statute of frauds. If the defense fails because 
of the merchant's exception, the proponent of the 
oral contract still has the burden of proving that a 
contract was made before the proponent issued the. 
written confirmation.™20 
FN18. Wash.Rev.Code. § 62A.2-201(2). 
FN19.W. 
FN20. U.C.C. §2-201 cmt. 3. 
*4 BDI argues that the district court's determination 
that no reasonable jury could conclude that a 
contract had been formed or that the parties 
understood there to have been a confirmation is 
inconsistent with the record. The record indicates 
that BDI sent Apex the standard Apex distribution 
contract with the modifications signed by Baskin. 
The record does not show that Apex objected to 
these modifications within the proscribed ten day 
period. Apex subsequently shipped Apex products 
to BDI, referred its dealers to BDI, and gave BDI 
technical support and otherwise performed as 
required under the contract. BDI asserts that the 
modified agreement and cover letter are 
confirmatory writings and that the initial stocking 
order constitutes a confirmation of the distribution 
agreement. BDI contends that this evidence 
illustrates that Apex agreed to perform under the 
terms of the modified contract and that a jury 
should be allowed to weigh the evidence to 
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determine whether or not Apex indeed acted 
consistent with the agreement. 
While "questions about whether a party received the 
writing, whether it was received within a reasonable 
time, whether the receiver had reason to know its 
contents, sent objections, or the like, are questions 
of fact," whether a writing in confirmation of an 
oral contract satisfies the statute of frauds is an 
issue of law for the court.™21 
FN21. GPL Treatment, Ltd. v. 
Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 323 Or. 116, 914 
P.2d 682, 686 (Or. 1996) {citing Ronald A. 
Anderson, 2 Uniform Commercial Code, § 
2-201:146 (3d ed. 1982 & Supp.1995)). 
Relying on Howard Construction Co. v. Jeff-Cole 
Quarries, Inc.™22 the district court determined 
that a confirmatory writing must be sufficient in and 
of itself to indicate that a contract for sale has been 
made. In Howard Construction, the court 
suggested that in order for a writing to indicate that 
the parties had reached an agreement and not simply 
negotiations, the writing should include the terms " 
in confirmation of," "as per our agreement," or "as 
sold to buyer." FN23 Many other courts, however, 
have not required that the confirmatory writing 
expressly refer to the oral contract which it confirms 
or include specific contents, but only that the 
writing afford a basis for believing the offered oral 
evidence rests on a real transaction.™24 
FN22. 669 S.W.2d221 (Mo.Ct.App.1984). 
FN23. M a t 227-28. 
FN24. See, e.g., Hilord Chem. Corp. v. 
Ricoh Elec, Inc., 875 F.2d 32 (2d 
Cir.1989) (holding no rigid requirement as 
to form or content of confirmatory 
writing); Rockland Indus., Inc. v. Frank 
Kasmir Assocs., 470 F.Supp. 1176 
(N.D.Tex. 1979) (writing need only be 
consistent with sale predicated upon prior 
transaction). 
Under Washington law, when "there are more than 
one written document that relate to the same subject 
matter, [which] are not inconsistent with each other 
and appear to be executed as part of the same 
transaction, they may be considered together to 
determine the parties' intent." FN25 The parol 
evidence rule does not apply when the parties are 
seeking to establish the validity or invalidity of a 
contract.FN26 The parol evidence rule " 
presupposes an action based on a valid contract; 
and if the issue is as to the existence or validity of 
the alleged contract, the rule, by its very terms, has 
no application." FN27 
FN25. Spokane Helicopter Ser., Inc. v. 
Malone, 28 Wash.App. 377, 623 P.2d 727, 
730 (Wash.App. 1981). 
FN26. Bond v. Wiegardt, 36 Wash.2d 41, 
216 P.2d 196, 200 (Wash.1950); In re 
Prior Bros., Inc. Int'l Harvester Co. v. 
Bank of Cal, N.A., 29 Wash.App. 905, 
632 P.2d 522 (Wash.App. 1981). 
FN27. Bond, 216 P.2d at 200. 
*5 The district court properly examined both the 
cover letter, BDI's and Apex's actions and the 
distribution agreement to determine that BDI did 
not satisfy the merchant's exception to the statute of 
frauds. Baskin's cover letter to Apex states that he 
modified the distribution agreement in certain 
respects and requested that Hanchette approve the 
modifications made by initialing and dating the 
contract. Hanchette never did. In addition, the 
court found important the language in the cover 
letter from Baskin to Hanchette in which Baskin 
wrote, "[w]e are excited as ever at Baskin 
Distribution to begin our relationship with Apex 
and hope that these changes do not prevent a 
mutually beneficial relationship from beginning." 
The district court concluded that this language, 
along with Baskin's alteration of the distribution 
agreement, indicate that the contract was in the 
negotiation process, and thus not yet formed. The 
proponent of an oral contract always maintains the 
burden of proving that a contract was made before 
the proponent issued the written confirmation.FN28 
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The writing cannot be a confirmation of a 
nonexistent contract. The merchant's exception 
does not apply. 
FN28. U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 3. 
C Set-Off 
The district court granted Pittway's motion for 
summary judgment on a counterclaim against BDI 
arising out of BDI's decision not to pay for the 
initial stocking order of May 9, 1995. The court 
found that the stocking order was wholly separate 
from the distribution agreement and that BDI is 
liable for $58,964.62 plus interest (the price of the 
goods ordered and received). 
BDI has refused to pay for this initial order because 
it believes the goods price should serve as a set-off 
for the alleged breach of contract. BDI asserts that 
the initial stocking order was wholly related to the 
distribution agreement as BDI would have no 
interest in a single inventory order without the 
24-month exclusive distribution agreement. BDI 
argues that it is unjust to compel BDI to pay for an 
order it placed in reliance on an agreement which 
Apex now disavows. 
Under the U.C.C, an individual may have an 
obligation to pay for goods tendered and accepted 
notwithstanding allegations that a distribution 
agreement has been breached.™29 In this case, 
the district court found that the order placed for the 
goods BDI received was separate from any alleged 
distribution agreement entered into between the 
parties. Accordingly, the district court correctly 
held BDI liable for the costs of the goods received. 
FN29. United Beer Distrib. Co. v. Hiram 
Walker (N.Y.), Inc., 163 A.D.2d 79, 81, 
557 N.Y.S.2d 336 (N.Y.App.Div.1990) (" 
The only sale documents herein [a series of 
purchasing orders] concern individual 
shipments of beer and have nothing to do 
with the asserted distribution agreement.") 
C.A.9 (Wash.),1998. 
Baskin Distribution, Inc. v. Pittway Corp. 
141 F.3d 1173, 1998 WL 101691 (C.A.9 (Wash.)) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
AFFIRMED. 
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United States District Court,W.D. Texas, El Paso 
Division. 
Frank SEGALINE and Anita Segaline, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., Defendant 
No. EP-02-CA-185-DB. 
April 18,2003. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
BRIONES, J. 
* 1 0 n this day, the Court considered a "Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Brief in Support of 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" (the " 
Summary Judgment Motion"), filed by Plaintiffs 
Frank Segaline and Anita Segaline in the 
above-captioned cause on January 30, 2003. On 
February 14, 2003, Defendant Bank of America, N 
.A. filed a "Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant's 
Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment" (the " 
Counter-Motion"). After due consideration, the 
Court is of the opinion that Plaintiffs Summary 
Judgment Motion should be denied and that 
Defendant's Counter-Motion should be granted. 
BACKGROUND 
This case arises out of Defendant's refusal to make a 
home equity loan to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs initially 
filed this case in state court, bringing one cause of 
action for breach of contract and a second cause of 
action for violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f. 
Defendant removed the case to this Court based on 
federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiffs subsequently 
amended their Complaint twice, with Plaintiffs' 
Second Amended Complaint being the operative 
pleading. The Second Amended Complaint alleges 
essentially the same two causes of action. 
Defendant filed an Answer to the Second Amended 
Complaint on January 3, 2003. The instant 
Summary Judgment Motion and Counter-Motion 
followed. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment should be granted only where " 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party that moves 
for summary judgment bears an initial burden of 
identifying those portions of the pleadings and 
discovery on file, together with any affidavit, which 
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine 
issue of material fact. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 411 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 
91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "If the moving party fails to 
meet this burden, the motion must be denied, 
regardless of the nonmovant's response." Tubacex, 
Inc. v. M/VRisan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir.1995). 
If the movant does meet this burden, however, the 
nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and 
designate specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. See, e.g., Celotex, 477 U.S. 
at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. "If the non-movant fails 
to meet this burden, then summary judgment is 
appropriate." Tubacex, 45 F.3d at 954. 
When making a determination under Rule 56, 
factual questions and inferences are viewed in a 
light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Lemelle 
v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th 
Cir.1994). The party opposing a motion supported 
by evidence cannot discharge his burden by alleging 
mere legal conclusions. See Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, All U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 
2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Instead, the party 
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must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat 
a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment. See id. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Facts 
*2 The material facts in this case are not in dispute. 
In January 2002, Plaintiffs, formerly husband and 
wife, applied for a home equity loan from 
Defendant, offering as collateral a home in El Paso 
that they contend is their homestead. On June 30, 
2000, a year and a half before they applied for the 
loan, Plaintiffs were divorced in El Paso, Texas. 
Pursuant to the divorce decree, they continue to 
jointly own the home until it is sold. Frank Segaline 
pursued the loan while Anita Segaline was in 
Connecticut tending to her mother who was ill. 
Throughout the loan application process, Frank 
Segaline referred to Anita Segaline as his "wife." In 
her affidavit, Lisa Rosales, Defendant's loan officer 
who processed the application for Frank Segaline, 
attests that he continuously referred to Anita 
Segaline as his wife, leading Rosales to believe that 
Plaintiffs were still legally married. Plaintiffs do not 
itfiite Rosales's statements, nor does Frank Segaline 
deny having referred to Anita Segaline as his wife. 
FNl 
FN1. In fact, in the second paragraph of 
his affidavit attached to Plaintiffs' 
Summary Judgment Motion, Frank 
Segaline states that he is the "former 
husband of Anita Segaline," then goes on 
to say: "My wife and I are still the owners 
of the home...." (Emphasis added.) The 
Court notes that the parol evidence rule 
does not prevent the consideration of such 
evidence when the existence of the 
contract is at issue, as discussed below. 
Muhm v. Davis, 580 S.W.2d 98, 101 
(Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ 
ref d n.r.e.). 
Once Defendant approved Plaintiffs' loan 
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application, Defendant forwarded copies of the loan 
documents to Anita Segaline in Connecticut for 
signature. The document entitled "Texas Home 
Equity Security Instrument" was intended to create 
a security interest in the home that would be subject 
to the protections provided for in Section 50(a)(6) 
of Article XVI of the Texas Constitution, discussed 
below. The first page of that document indicates 
that the instrument was to be made by "FRANK 
SEGALINE AND ANITA SEGALINE, MARRIED 
TO EACH OTHER." The last page provided a 
space for each Plaintiff to sign as grantors. The line 
provided for Anita Segaline's signature also 
included the phrase "MARRIED TO EACH 
OTHER." In both places, Anita Segaline lined out 
the phrase "MARRIED TO EACH OTHER" and 
wrote "Divorced 6/30/00." Both Plaintiffs signed 
the last page of the document, along with other 
documents related to the loan. Upon receipt of the 
altered document, Defendant became concerned 
that the home that was to be collateral for the loan 
may not be Anita Segaline's homestead. A closer 
look at Anita Segaline's credit report also revealed 
her address to be in Connecticut which cast further 
concern over her homestead claim. When asked, 
Frank Segaline refused to provide any information 
concerning the issue. Defendant then withdrew its 
loan offer. Plaintiffs obtained alternate financing at 
a higher rate and filed this cause to recover the 
difference. 
B. Defendant is Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of 
Law 
In their Summary Judgment Motion, Plaintiffs ask 
the Court to grant judgment in their favor only on 
their breach of contract claim and do not address 
their ECOA claim. In its Counter-Motion, 
Defendant asks the Court for judgment on both. The 
Court will address each claim in turn. 
/. Plaintiffs' Breach of Contract Claim 
Plaintiffs contend that they had entered into a 
contract with Defendant for a home equity loan at a 
specified rate and that Defendant breached the 
contract when it withdrew approval of the loan. 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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Defendant argues that no contract was formed 
because Anita Segaline altered a material term of 
the offer when she replaced the phrase "MARRIED 
TO EACH OTHER" with "Divorced 6/30/00." 
Defendant contends that Anita Segaline's 
amendment constituted a counteroffer which 
Defendant chose not to accept. The Court agrees 
with Defendant. 
*3 To prevail on their breach of contract claim, 
Plaintiffs must show the existence of a valid 
contract, that they performed or tendered 
performance, that Defendant breached the contract, 
and that their damages resulted from that breach. 
Abraxas Petroleum Corp. v.. Hornburg, 20 S.W.3d 
741, 758 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.). For 
there to be a binding contract, there must be "(1) an 
offer; (2) acceptance in strict compliance with the 
terms of the offer; (3) a meeting of the minds; (4) a 
communication that each party has consented to the 
terms of the agreement; and (5) execution and 
delivery of the contract with an intent that it become 
mutual and binding on both parties." Hallmark v. 
Hand, 885 S.W.2d 471, 476 (Tex.App.-El Paso 
1994, writ denied). Plaintiffs have not met their 
burden to show that a valid contract existed. 
Specifically, Plaintiffs skip over the five elements 
listed above and jump directly to their argument 
that the contract was breached. Before there can be 
a breach, however, there must be a contract. 
Therefore, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiffs' 
Summary Judgment Motion should be denied. 
In its Counter-Motion, Defendant challenges the 
existence of the contract, arguing that Plaintiffs 
never accepted Defendant's offer because they 
changed a material term. Defendant offered the 
home equity loan to Plaintiffs with the 
understanding that they were legally married and 
that the home was their homestead. Article 16, § 
50(a) and (a)(6) of the Texas Constitution provides 
protection for a family or single person's homestead 
from forced sale for the payment of debts except 
under certain circumstances, including where the 
debt is secured by a voluntary lien on the 
homestead, as in the loan requested by Plaintiffs. 
TEX. CONST, art. XVI, § 50(a), (a)(6). Because of 
this protection, Defendant would enjoy enforceable 
security in the collateral whereas another creditor 
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satisfaction of an unrelated debt. If the home was 
not the homestead of either Frank or Anita Segaline, 
Article 16 would not apply. Each of the documents 
signed by Plaintiffs and offered as summary 
judgment evidence refers to Article 16, thus 
homestead protection under the Texas Constitution 
was undoubtedly a material term of the loan offer. 
Based on Frank Segaline's choice of words, 
Defendant's officers believed that Anita Segaline 
was still his wife. Anita Segaline's revelation to the 
contrary cast doubt on the characterization of the 
home as Plaintiffs' homestead. Although Plaintiffs 
need not be married for their homestead to be 
protected by Article 16, it is their burden to 
establish the homestead character of the property. 
Sanchez v. Telles, 960 S.W.2d 762, 770 
(Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, pet. denied) (citations 
omitted). To do so, "the claimant must show a 
combination of both overt acts of homestead usage 
and the intention on the part of the owner to claim 
the land as a homestead." Id. 
*4 In this case, Frank Segaline misrepresented the 
Plaintiffs' marital status during the loan application 
process. When Defendant learned Plaintiffs' true 
status, it created significant doubt as to a material 
term of the contract-that the collateral was the 
homestead of the borrowers. Because this change 
occurred, there was no acceptance by Plaintiffs of 
Defendant's offer. Without acceptance, there is no 
contract, and in the absence of a contract, there can 
be no breach. Therefore, the Court is of the opinion 
that Defendant's Counter-Motion should be granted 
as to Plaintiffs breach of contract claim. 
II. Plaintiffs' Equal Credit Opportunity Act Claim 
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs also 
allege that Defendant denied the loan because of 
their marital status, in violation of the ECOA. In the 
Counter-Motion, Defendant argues that its concern 
with Plaintiffs' marital status was in relation to the 
characterization of the collateral as Plaintiffs' 
homestead, and therefore related to Defendant's 
rights and remedies as creditor. The Court agrees 
with Defendant. 
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Title 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) prohibits a creditor 
from discriminating against an applicant based on 
marital status. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(a)(1) (West 
1998). Section 1691(b)(1), however, specifies that 
an inquiry into the marital status of a credit 
applicant to determine the creditor's rights and 
remedies does not constitute discrimination under 
the ECOA. Id § 1691(b)(1). This case could not be 
more clear. Defendant denied the loan because it 
was a home equity loan offered under the provisions 
of the Texas Constitution and Defendant had no 
assurance that the collateral was Plaintiffs' 
homestead. Plaintiffs' marital status only became an 
issue in so much as it affected whether or not the 
collateral was in fact the homestead for both 
Plaintiffs. Such an inquiry goes to the heart of 
Defendant's rights and remedies as the creditor on 
such a loan. Plaintiff has offered no evidence to 
refute Defendant's properly supported 
Counter-Motion on this point. Therefore, the Court 
is of the opinion that Defendant's Counter-Motion 
should be granted as to Plaintiffs' ECOA claim. 
W.D.Tex.,2003. 
Segaline v. Bank of America, N.A. 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2003 WL 21135553 
(W.D.Tex.) 
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CONCLUSION 
After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion 
that Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Motion should 
be denied. The Court is further of the opinion that 
Defendant's Counter-Motion should be granted as to 
both of Plaintiffs' claims. 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
Plaintiffs Frank Segaline's and Anita Segaline's " 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Brief in 
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" 
is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Bank 
of America, N.A.'s "Counter-Motion for Summary 
Judgment" is GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the 
above-captioned cause is DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE. 
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that all other pending 
motions, if any, are DENIED AS MOOT. 
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